Israeli recognition of sovereignty over part of Judea and Samaria, Heaven forbid, would constitute a dangerous precedent in policy. Our sovereignty in Judea and Samaria is well anchored in international law.
Israel celebrates and commemorates the date of UN General Assembly Resolution for Partition 181, which we know as the "29th of November". But the real and more significant partition resolution, granting Israel its legal legitimacy to govern in Jerusalem as well as in Judea and Samaria, was taken 27 years before, in April 1920 in San Remo, Italy, at the conclusion of the conference of the Allied Supreme Council after the First World War.
The resolution partitioned the extensive territories of the defeated and fragmented Ottoman Empire, which was the last legal sovereign of the territory (Turkey, the inheritor of the empire, voluntarily conceded these territories three years later, effectively adding more validity to the resolution of the victorious powers) among the various peoples of the region. We must not forget that this was one expansive territorial unit, which was entirely under the sovereignty of Turkey and then was claimed by the peoples who had been under its authority and sovereignty, demanding independence, or, in the language of those days, "self-determination", on the path to becoming sovereign national entities.
Among these peoples was the Jewish People. Nearly a million people who had been scattered throughout the former empire, among tens of millions of Arab Muslims (and several million Christians). The various peoples did receive their appropriate parcels of land from the victorious powers, according to their proportion – the Arabs received the vast majority of the territory, while the Jews received the strip along the coast of the Land of Israel and some land east of it – territory that is today the Kingdom of Jordan. This was the only partition that is relevant to the question of the right to govern and sovereignty in the territories of the Middle East.
All of the parties, it must be stated, accepted the resolution (contrary to what happened on the 29th of November). The Arabs of the Land of Israel, whose leadership opposed it, were not considered to be a separate unit, but part of the Arab nation that was represented at San Remo by Faisal, scion of the Hashemite family (which currently governs in Jordan) described at the time as the "King of Syria", and the Land of Israel was considered part of it. That same Faisal, in the previous year, had signed an agreement with Haim Weizmann, in which they both recognized each other's rights. In this respect, the San Remo Conference was a natural continuation of this mutual recognition and more importantly – it was accepted by both sides.
The rest is known – the British tore off the eastern part of the Mandatory Land of Israel, with the approval of the League of Nations – and handed it over to the Hashemites to establish a kingdom there. This was the last territorial change, in terms of international law, that occurred in the territory of the Mandate. Jordan invaded the remaining territory of the Land of Israel during the War of Independence, as the Egyptians did in the south. Both countries' occupation of territory west of the Jordan and northeast of the Sinai Peninsula were, therefore, cases of illegal occupation and aggressive foreign invasion into territory of the defender, Israel, regardless of Partition Resolution 181 (which is non-binding – and was immediately rejected by the Arab side so that it was left void of any validity, as it was in the first place).
The young State of Israel did what it could at that time, in order to establish and validate her legal right to the territory of the Land of Israel that was granted her by law and the competent authority (the victorious powers that received the right from Turkey) and applied her sovereignty over all territories that she possessed at the end of the war – regardless of Partition Resolution 181 and its outlined borders. At that time, the only two relevant borders were these: the western borders of the Land of Israel as outlined at San Remo (and afterward the "correction" that created the Kingdom of Jordan) and the Armistice Demarcation Lines, regarding which it is clearly stated that they are not political borders, but only represent the location of the armies at the end of the battles. In applying her sovereignty, Israel said in effect, that she does not concede her rights in every place that was allocated to her at San Remo and that she could exercise her sovereignty. Eastern Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria and Gaza – were not in Israel's possession so Israel could not exercise her rights there.
This situation changed in 1967: Israel liberated all of the territories that are hers according to law, and hastened to apply sovereignty in Jerusalem, thus exercising her legal rights. On the other hand, she was prevented from applying sovereignty in the remaining territory and apparently left her intentions toward it in question. However, her practical control – not only as a military power but also as such that administrated (and still administers partially) civil life there – left a clear opening that Israel might decide to exercise her rights in the remaining territory as well. The Oslo Accords did some harm to this, but not entirely, since they left all options open. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, does more harm, since it constitutes a clear concession of territory, in contrast to Judea and Samaria (including northern Samaria, which remains under Israel's security control even after communities were uprooted, which was clearly not called for, according to any political or logical frame of reference).
Currently, if Israel were to apply sovereignty only in part of the territory that she possesses, while she has the capability to apply it on all of the territory – this step might be interpreted as relinquishing her rights on the rest of the territory, in the dangerous situation where there is an alternative sovereign that is demanding recognition of its rights (In 1967 the situation was different) – Jordan was not an alternative sovereign, since no state except for Britain and Pakistan recognized its claim of sovereignty in the territory. But currently, a majority of the member states of the UN are willing to recognize the Palestinian claim). Therefore, in effect, for Israel to apply sovereignty in part of the territory might have the opposite effect – since she does not apply sovereignty in the rest of the territory it could be interpreted as a "relinquishing" of territory where she did not apply sovereignty more than a recognition of the places where she did apply sovereignty.
There are also totally practical ramifications: What will become of the Jewish communities? How will they be able to develop, if a clear line is drawn around them, beyond which the State of Israel no longer have the authority to expand the communities on the state's land? How will Israel be able to continue to pave life-saving bypass roads (not to mention improvements in the quality of life for a half million Israeli residents, who even now spend hours in traffic jams every day), if she relinquished state lands as lands available for future roads and be left only with the roads that currently exist?
The significance of partial application of sovereignty, therefore, might truly suffocate the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. A community that cannot develop does not remain in place, but goes backward. The population is aging as a result of the difficulty for young couples to build a new home – which will not exist - and the transportation difficulties, which are like a noose to the communities, more access will become more difficult than ever. Some of these things would be possible to solve by an objective legal system, which did not value superfluous "universal" considerations over Zionist principles (which, in any case, are still the basis of the State of Israel) and if there were no concern that the court would interfere and overturn a decision by the Knesset on sovereignty, in the future, perhaps, to correct some of these difficulties – but today's court, the incarnation of the High Court of Justice, decidedly cannot be trusted.
We must be very careful, therefore, not to bind vital Israel's hands and limit the Jewish communities by a step that on one hand goes totally in the right direction, but whose hidden ramifications, which are not obvious at the moment, might have consequences that will be difficult to correct afterward.